



Total investment in the EU has decreased 
considerably in the past decade, by historical 
standards. Throughout the period following the 
Great Recession, both public and private investment 
contracted. The present situation is characterised 
by a chronic lack of investment. On one side, the 
private sector is deleveraging from past excess of 
debt (McKinsey, 2012; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; 
Haldane, 2015) and is therefore not willing to play the 
leading role (Eggertson and Krugman, 2010; Jordá et 
al. 2013; IMF, 2013); recent surveys (ECB, 2015) show 
that the main reason for business to refrain from new 
investments is the expectation of low aggregate 
demand1. On the other side, the public sector, which 
is expected to contribute to stabilisation in such 
circumstances, has been constrained by the lasting 
effects of the sovereign debt crisis.
This worrying trend of low levels of investment is 
particularly evident when we look at net investment, 
i.e. net fixed capital formation which takes into 
account the depreciation of the existing capital stock. 
The fall in net investment after the Great Recession 
was extremely pronounced; if we take the United 
States as a benchmark we observe a similar trend, 
with some differences. First of all, when we look more 
in detail at the difference between sectors, we see 
that net investment by the private sector started to 
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recover earlier in the US and has almost reached pre-
crisis levels; in the EU and in the euro area it started 
to recover only after the second “dip” of the recession, 
and has not yet reached the average pre-crisis levels. 
It took almost a decade for the European 
Union (EU), and the euro area in particular, 
to recover from the Great Recession. 
Something that has not fully recovered 
in the EU, nevertheless, is investment. The 
current debate about the status of the 
European economy often points to the 
need to boost investment. The efforts focus, 
on one side, on creating better conditions 
for the business sector to engage in 
more investment, and, on the other side, 
on changing the composition of public 
finances for government budgets to devote 
a larger share to investment. This policy 
brief argues that the space available for 
additional investment is less constrained 
than usually assumed and that boosting 
investment today is possible.
The Case for Public Investment in the EU
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Secondly, net investment by the public sector did 
not recover in the EU as it did in the US; in particular 
in the euro area it has stagnated for years, even 
reaching negative values, in some years, and in some 
countries for even longer. Negative values mean 
that in those cases current investment are not even 
sufficient to maintain the existing capital stock, an 
unprecedented situation in Europe. Between 2014 
and 2017 the missing amount of public investment in 
the euro area, needed to simply maintain the existing 
capital stock, was over € 21 billion.
Such low levels of investment, particularly 
public investment, may have important negative 
consequences if protracted. On the one hand, 
they contribute to keeping aggregate demand at 
subdued levels; on the other hand, they negatively 
affect growth potential.
In order to assess whether the current level of 
investment is to be considered too low or not, we can 
compare it with its historical average. Comparison 
with past levels may raise the objection that such 
past levels could not necessarily be optimal, for this 
reason we use long-term averages spanning over 
forty years, therefore several economic cycles, for 
most countries. Data exist for most countries to 
build time series of this indicator since 1970. Chart 
2 provides this detailed information for each country.
First of all, we observe that in most Member 
States net public investment during this decade 
is considerably lower than the historical average, 
with the exception of Latvia, Hungary, Poland 
and Bulgaria, where it is significantly higher, and 
Denmark and Lithuania, where it is slightly higher. 
Then, we also observe that during this decade the 
level of public investment has been on average 
negative in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy and in the 
Czech Republic, and null in Germany.
Chart 1: Net Investment as a share of GDP in the EU, euro area, and US
Note: Net fixed capital formation, % GDP, 1990-2018. 
Source: own elaborations on AMECO data.
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The chart shows the deferred effects on public 
investment during this decade of contractionary 
fiscal policies implemented to face the sovereign debt 
crisis. There is evidence that public investment was 
the first “victim” of restrictive fiscal policies across 
the Union, and as a matter of fact we see the level 
of net public investment falling to unprecedented 
low levels in the euro area and in the EU. A negative 
gap can also be observed in the case of the US, but 
it is smaller than in 16 EU countries, among which 
the largest economies; Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, all have larger 
investment gaps than in the US. 
These data suggest that a considerable 
investment gap has developed in the EU over the 
past decade. Such gap is particularly pronounced 
for public investment, although also private 
investment is still below pre-crisis levels.
The fiscal space
The main constraint to a strong and fast recovery of 
the level of public investment is often considered to 
be the scarce availability of fiscal space in the public 
finances of EU countries. A key indicator to analyse 
public debt dynamics and to understand the available 
fiscal space for public finances is the differential 
between the interest rate paid on additional debt 
and the expected growth rate. Higher values of 
interest rates contribute to increasing the debt ratio 
by expanding the deficit, while higher GDP growth 
rates reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by increasing 
the denominator. Thus the larger the interest rate–
growth differential, the faster is the growth of the 
debt ratio. If this differential is, instead, negative the 
debt-to-GDP ratio will be on a declining path even 
without any primary surplus, i.e. the simple roll-over 
of existing debt would lead to a reduction of the ratio.
Chart 2: Net Public Investment as a share of GDP in EU Member States since 1970
Note: Net fixed capital formation by the general government, as a % of GDP. The historical average refers to the annual 
average calculated over the entire period of 40 years from 1970 to 2010 for countries where the full time series is 
available; it starts in 1971 for Denmark, in 1974 for Ireland, in 1978 for Portugal, in 1989 for Greece, in 1990 for Latvia 
and Luxembourg, in 1991 for Bulgaria and Poland, in 1993 for Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovakia, in 1995 for the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Romania, and Slovenia, and in 2001 for Croatia. The “’10s” average refers to the 
annual average between 2011 and 2018, for all countries.
Source: own elaborations on AMECO data.
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The current macroeconomic context points to very 
low, if not negative, real interest rates. In all advanced 
economies (EA, US, or Japan), market expectations of 
the inflation rate for the next 10 years are lower than 
the target of 2%. This data signals that the present 
environment of extremely low interest rates may be 
prolonged; the market expectation of real interest 
rates over the next 10 years, in fact, is zero (Fatás and 
Summers, 2016) or even negative (Blanchard, 2019). 
The following chart shows the long-run evolution of 
the observed differential between interest rate-growth 
over the past six decades, since 1960. It presents the 
annual average differential per each decade, in the main 
EU countries, plus the US and Japan as benchmarks.
We see that such differential between interest rate 
and growth was, on average, negative during the 
‘60s and the ‘70s and positive during the following 
three decades, for the main advanced economies. An 
important change occurred during the past decade, 
when this differential turned negative for many 
countries and on average for the EU. This might 
suggest that the broad macroeconomic context has 
changed, concerns about public debt sustainability 
might be less pressing, and fiscal space might on 
average larger than previously assumed.
Chart 3: Actual interest rate-growth differentials over the past six decades
Note: the chart shows the average actual differential per decade in the major EU economies, plus the EU and euro area 
aggregates and the US and Japan, since 1960.
Source: own elaborations on AMECO data.
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For our purposes of understanding the fiscal 
space available for public investment, however, 
we should take into account that investment 
is implemented over a medium- to long-term 
perspective, so its planning is made on the 
basis of medium- to long-term expectations 
of the interest rate-growth differentials, which 
may differ from what then actually materialises. 
Therefore, in order to better assess to what extent 
governments can plan a fiscal stimulus to finance 
additional investment we should also take into 
account the ex-ante expected interest rate-growth 
differential, and not just the one observed ex-post.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) publishes 
since 2009 its Fiscal Monitor, in which it surveys 
and analyses public finance developments 
and projections, with a view to sustainable 
public finances. Since 2011 it publishes also 
twice per year the indicator relative to the 
projected interest rate–growth differential, 
over the following 5 years, for each country. 
The following chart assembles all the subsequent 
vintages of the IMF Fiscal Monitor presenting 
the projected interest rate–growth differential 
over the following 5 years. It shows one striking 
trend, common to all advanced economies: 
the continuous decline in such differential, 
which now is negative territory for virtually 
all EU countries (with two exceptions, for 
which nevertheless the differential although 
positive is still very low by historical standard).
Chart 4: Projected 5-year interest rate-growth differentials in EU countries, 2011-2019
Note: the chart shows the projected differential over the following five years, per each point in time. This means, for 
instance, that the May 2011 values refer to the projected differential from 2011 to 2016, and the values for April 2019 
refer to the differential until 2024.
Source: own elaborations on several vintages of the IMF Fiscal Monitor database.
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This trend is quite clear; it started in 2012 after 
the ECB announced its decided intervention to 
counter the sovereign debt crisis and to play 
a more active role in supporting the monetary 
union. The speed of the steady reduction in the 
interest rate-growth differential is in fact more 
pronounced in the euro area, but the crucial fact 
that for almost all countries the differential is now 
projected to be negative is common to the entire EU.
Regardless of whether this scenario is due to 
subdued aggregate demand – according to the so-
called “secular stagnation” hypothesis (Summers, 
2015) – or to international transmission of saving-
investment disequilibria – according to the so-
called “global savings glut” hypothesis (Bernanke, 
2005) – it is to be considered as a “new normal” 
to which macroeconomic policies have to adapt. 
The case for public investment
In this context of historically low real interest rates, 
all data point towards the existence of a larger 
fiscal space than previously assumed. At the same 
time, we have documented the unprecedented fall 
in the level of public investment in the EU. The 
case for large programmes of public investment 
seems therefore compelling, for several reasons.
• First, with real interest rates close to zero, or 
even below that level, any investment which 
yields minimum returns basically pays for 
itself (IMF, 2014). All the more so if there is a 
considerable investment gap and if investment 
can be directed towards project of common 
interest, with positive spillovers across the EU.
• Second, there is increasing evidence that, when 
monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower 
bound (ZLB) on interest rates, fiscal multipliers 
are higher than one (Canzoneri et al, 2016; Jordá 
and Taylor, 2016), this implies that any deficit-
financed public investment will also reduce 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, over the medium term.
• Third, there is evidence that prolonged cyclical 
events, like demand shortfalls, can have 
permanent, structural and long-term effects on 
potential output. In other words, a prolonged 
period of subdued aggregate demand has not 
only shot-term implications on the depth of 
the recession, but also and most importantly 
it reduces permanently the productive capacity 
(Banchard and Summers, 1986). It counteracts 
and neutralises improvements that structural 
reforms can bring on the supply side. 
• Fourth, the consequent observation that 
costs of public debt are lower than previously 
assumed (Blanchard, 2019) implies that using 
fiscal space to reduce levels of public debt may 
not be more welfare-enhancing than devoting 
it to additional productive investment, and 
that instead the net value of a debt-financed 
investment programme would be higher.
• Fifth, with monetary policy close to the zero 
lower bound, the usual sharp reduction in 
interest rates2  will probably not be available as 
a policy option for central banks in the event of 
a next recession, so fiscal policies will have to 
bear the burden and responsibility to counter it.
The combination of all these facts suggests that 
there is a strong economic rationale for additional, 
debt-financed public investment across the 
EU. The country-specific conditions should be 
taken into account and the overall fiscal effort in 
support of public investment could be made in a 
differentiated way. However, the data show that 
today twenty countries of the EU, accounting for 
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more than 81% of the EU’s GDP, have at the same 
time a clear investment gap and an expected 
negative interest rate-growth differential. In these 
cases the case for additional debt-financed public 
investment seems therefore especially compelling.
If projects of common interest for the entire 
Union can be identified, such as providing 
European public goods (Lamy and Von 
Weizsäcker, 2019), the overall return on such 
investment can be even amplified through 
positive spillover effects and economies of scale.
Footnotes
1   The ECB Report on the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises in the euro area says: “Euro 
area SMEs considered access to finance to be the least important problem that they faced (11% of respondents, 
unchanged from the previous round), although results differ across countries. Instead, finding customers remains 
their main concern (25% of respondents, down from 26% in the previous round).”
2   Data suggest that to counter a recession central banks usually cut interest rates by 400 to 500 basis points.
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